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SD1 1983-1 986: From Myth to Logos 
On 23 March 1983, the American 
President Ronald Reagan surprised the 
world by expressing his desire to ren- 
der nuclear weapons ((useless and ob- 
soleten and his willingness to sponsor 
research in order to assess the possibi- 
lities of a defense system intended to 
secure total survival rather a holo- 
caust. 
The President's more or less inge- 
nuous words were to be followed by an 
intense debate which is still far from 
finished. A part of the US Administra- 
tion itself showed signs of open distrut 
towards the President's plan. European 
allies deemed it childish if not dange- 
rous. Great sections of public opinion 
expressed doubts about Ronald Rea- 
gan's good faith, and he became trans- 
formed overnight i n t ~  the world's fore- 
most pacifist, which, however, did not 
prevent him from deciding to deploy 
the antiquated eurornissiles in West 
Germany and in four other countries in 
the Old World. To make matters worse, 
the White House found that significant 
portions of scientific circles began to 
adopt critica1 positions with regard to 
the project of strategic defense, basica- 
lly because of its technical requeri- 
ments but also in view of its uncertain 
strategic results. 
Summing up, in 1983 only a few 
were convinced of a beneficial future 
for such a research project and the 
general mood was to believe space 
defense belonged to the world of 
dreams and of the President's grandio- 
se gestures and hollow words which 
would be lost in a vacuum. 
The idea that the project would not 
pass beyond initial stage has become 
deep rooted in portions of the pacifist 
movement, mainly in Europe, where 
news on SD1 was accompanied by 
harsh criticism from such serious and 
rigorous groups as the Federation of' 
Anzerican Scientists and the Union of' 
Concerned Scientists. 
Due to their belief in the uselessness 
of the scientific effort involved, in the 
technical unfeasibility of a system such 
as the one advocated and -possibly- 
because of their belief in an ultimate 
sense of political discretion, the milita- 
rization of the Cosmos was denounced 
but it was at heart thought that the 
space defense system would never 
work and consequently the project be 
shelved sooner or later. 
However some three years later we 
know that things have not happened 
that way. Thus the vision announced 
by Reagan -far from being gone with 
the wind- grew into SD1 from April 
1984. It is a program aimed at resear- 
ching a defense system aimed to inter- 
cept and destroy the enemy's intercon- 
tinental ballistic missiles before they 
can reach their targets. The program 
has a budget of $ 26 billion unti1 fiscal 
year 1989 and is under the central 
control of the SDIO, a body headed by 
the General James A. Abrahansom, a 
high official who is directly in touch 
with the very President of the US. 
dize the currently valid concept of constructive alternative thus compe- 
Narms control.; and simultaneously lling the Soviet Union to adopt a dyna- 
there are no visible indications of a mics similar to that of SDI. 
SDI: The Militarization of Outer Space and 
lnternational Law 
The launching of the first Soviet 
sputnik on 4 October 1957 was to mark 
not only the beginning of the space age, 
but also a new frontier in the arms 
race. 
Although up to now a massive de- 
ployment of destructive weapons has 
not been seen in outer space, by the 
end of December 198 1 more than 2,3 14 
satellites for military use had been 
launched into orbit around the Earth. 
Both the US and the USSR already 
possess a certain capacity -although 
limited- that allows them to destroy 
or impair sateilites (ASAT system). 
This process of militarization is beco- 
ming increasingly intense due to the 
Strategic Defense Initiative or SD1 
adovocated by the Reagan Administra- 
tion and intented to help deployment 
of antimissiles weapons (DMD). The 
USSR has also improved this kind o€ 
weapons and doubtless will continue to 
do so in future. 
The present new phase of militariza- 
tion has been labelled [[Stars War* by 
way of being based on space arms and 
its use of more or less exotic technolo- 
gies. Such technologies are-prima facie 
considered non-nuclear and offer the 
possibility of having a dual function: 
ASAT and BMD. 
The implications of the new direc- 
tion of the arms race will have very 
far-reaching effects: 
a) Exorbitant costs, owing to the US 
Defense Department's intention to 
spend $25  billion over the fiscal period 
1985-1989; 
b) Strategic implications related 
mainly to deterrence and stability. SD1 
strictly implies a departure from --or 
at least a change in- the assumptions 
upon which deterrence was based, the 
key to strategic relations between both 
superpowers; and 
c) The compliance with internatio- 
nal law norms establishing and gover- 
ning the legal status of outer space as 
well with the agreements signed up to 
the present concerning arms control 
and disarmament. 
The objective of the present article is 
consideration of the general aspect of 
the above mentioned incident, a matter 
of some complexity. For one thing, 
technological dynamics are making ru- 
les currently in force obsolete -or at 
least inadequate. On the other hand, 
the world powers have not reached an 
agreement about what the function of 
outer space should be, and such a 
consensus is necessary in order to ela- 
borate norms governing international 
law. If agreements to date included a 
consensus about using space as a base 
of military facilities for observation 
and communications purposes, the pre- 
sent trend is to view outer space as a 
new specific battlefield in which orbi- 
ting systems will attempt to destroy or 
paralyse one another, very probably as 
a prelude or substitution for confronta- 
tions waged on earth. 
The Foreign Policy of the PSOE During the 
Spanish Political Transition: From Underground to 
the Constitution (1 974-1 978) 
The present article is the last of a 
series of three in which an analysis is 
made of the PSOE's foreign policy du- 
ring the transition period. In the first 
article, the role played by the PSOE as 
aopposition party)) once it recovered 
its legal status was explained, and in 
the second one, the party's principles 
adopted in its XXVIIth. Congress were 
set forth in detail and analysed. 
In this third part, the change in the 
way of analysing foreign affairs is the 
object of study. In fact, party-minded 
policies gave way to State policies, 
once the Party saw the possibility o£ 
becoming the (cparty in powern, thus 
corroborating the lack of a firm theore- 
tical base in the field of foreign policy. 
The conception of the PSOE concer- 
ning foreign affairs was marked on one 
hand by the policies set up by the 
Socialist International and on the ot- 
her hand, by matters pending in Spa- 
nish foreign policy. The incorporation 
of the PSP into the PSOE offered the 
theoretical and important base for fo- 
reign affairs as well as an overall vision 
of the country's foreign policy. 
During this period, the PSOE defen- 
ded a progressive and coherent line of 
policy in its foreign affairs, which was, 
however, unclear because of certain 
vacilations and setbacks which showed 
the lack of a theoretical base. An im- 
portant aspect in these years was the 
attempt to strengthen the role of Spain 
as a subject of world affairs and which 
consisted in devoting efforts to areas 
where success was secured beforehand. 
The Nicaraguan Foreign Debt 
The evolution of Nicaragua's rela- 
tionship with its creditors has gone 
through two phases, marked by an 
increase in the escalation of hostilities 
waged by the Reagan Administration 
against the Sandinist Government. Af- 
ter the people's triumph in July 1979, 
the Sandinist regime took responsibili- 
ty for the whole of the foreign debt 
which contracted up to that date. By 
the end of 1980, Nicaragua could delay, 
without the intervention of the IMF, 
the payment to commercial banks 
-mostly American- of $ 390 millon 
due between 1979 and 1982. The Go- 
vernment also attempted to obtain a 
global agreement with the Paris Club 
+f which Spain is a Member Coun- 
try- in order to negotiate the debt, but 
only bilateral agreements could be rea- 
ched with most countries, Spain inclu- 
ded. In 1982, the Sandinist Govern- 
ment renegotiated obligations of its 
now nationalized banks that amounted 
to $ 250 million; soon afterwards anot- 
her $ 100 million in private debt were 
renegotiated so as to gain access to 
international capital markets. The to- 
tal amount negotiated in 1982 was $ 
550 million with terms similar to those 
obtained in 1980: a maximun interest 
rate of 7 per cent, plus the difference 
between the market rate, with this 7 
per cent maximun rate being capitali- 
zed as principal. This provision alone 
provoked an increase in the debt equi- 
valent to the 6 per cent of the renego- 
tiated amount. The redemption period 
was extended to twelve years with a 
grace term of five years. These terms 
are, on the whole, not bad if one 
considers those which were being im- 
posed on Brazil, Mexico and Chile by 
that time. 
Since then, the World Bank has be- 
gun to refuse loans to Nicaragua, and 
in September 1984 the Bank suspended 
the payment of funds already assigned 
on the excuse that there were ~techni- 
cal,, reasons which were quite discri- 
minatory. In March 1985, the BID -a 
Pana-merican bank, let us note- gran- 
ted its last loan to Nicaragua. 
The Government of Nicaragua did 
not fai1 in its obligations, but endea- 
voured to collect funds to satisfy them; 
thus, acting independently -that is, 
without the impositions by the IMF- 
to continue the usual procedure inten- 
ded to restore credit in internationale 
markets. It attempted to reduce public 
expenditure within the limits allowed 
by the mixed-economy model it is fos- 
tering. Whenever possible, salaries and 
price increases were avoided; the na- 
tional currency was devaluated; and 
imports were kept at the minimun 
strictly essential to keep the economy 
working. However, owing to factors 
beyond the control of the Government 
of a very small country highly depen- 
dent on foreign trade, paying the debt 
became increasingly ardous and pain- 
ful. 
The terms of foreign trade play a 
large role in determining any country's 
capacity to reimburse as well as put- 
ting limits on its domestic efforts to 
dea1 with the payment of the debt. It 
must be said that the terms of Nicara- 
gua's foreign trade -apart from acon- 
tra,, disruption- have not been favou- 
rable at all regarding the payment of 
the debt. In recent years exports have 
fared badly owing to the difficulty of 
finding new markets and the constant 
deterioration of the exchange rate, 
which increasingly diminish Nicara- 
gua's capacity to import with a given 
value of its exports. 
Chile: Military Bureaucracy, Political Opposition 
and the Democratic Transition 
When one considers the processes in 
the transition to democracy which ha- 
ve taken place in Latin American coun- 
tries subjected to lengthy periods of 
authoritarian military governments 
over the last years, explanation of the 
persistence of the Chilean dictatorship 
and the capacity the authoritarian Sta- 
te still holds to attempt imposing a 
model of ~surveilled democracys ap- 
pears a complex matter. However, the 
economic crisis dating back to the se- 
cond half of 1981 and the vast process 
of social unrest against the dictators- 
hip beginning in 1983 have given birth 
to a progressive crisis and undermi- 
ning of the authoritarian regime set up 
in September 1973. 
Both developments signa1 the begin- 
ning of the slow and significant recove- 
ry of the leading role in the Social and 
political fields by a civil society subjec- 
ted to State oppression over more than 
a decade. The growth of popular de- 
monstrations facilitated both the rise 
of an informal political area and a 
discussion of the transition to demo- 
cracy into society's main political 
subject, while also generating a period 
of recurrent crisis in the authoritarian 
politica1 system. 
What the economic crisis revealed 
was the unfeasibility of the process of 
structural transformations put into 
practice by the military dictatorship 
since 1973, which meant to replace the 
pattern of development based on in- 
dustrialization by a new one featured 
by a highly diversified range of prima- 
ry exports. Such a policy should have 
facilitated the setting up of a self- 
regulated model of society governed by 
the forces of the market, and which 
would secure the reproduction of an 
authoritarian type of political system 
such as the one provided by the Politi- 
cal Constitution of 1980. The perma- 
nence both of the authoritarian politi- 
cal model as well as the Neo-liberal 
economic model would secure the 
transformation of the military bureau- 
cracy into a political class at the servi- 
ce of the State. The recurring crisis of 
the authoritarin political system -bet- 
ween 1981-85- has placed the political 
o~position into a new phase and has 
stiengthened its capaci-ty to manage 
the transition of societv to democracv. 
in spite of its high deg&e of fragmenta: 
tion. Such fragmentation reveals itself 
in the existence of two main opposition 
sectors which divide into three politi- 
cal blocks: Alianza Democratica (De- 
mocratic Alliance), Movimiento Demo- 
cratico Popular (People's Democratic 
Movement) and Bloque Socialista (So- 
cialist Block). The limits between both 
sectors arise from those who criticise 
the authoritarian nature of the politi- 
cal regime and those others who think 
such a regime is inherent to the histo- 
ric nature of dependent capitalism and 
therefore believe the transition to de- 
mocracy will be the result of an accom- 
panying process of radical changes of 
the structure of Chilean society. 
The specific purpose of the present 
article is an attempt to explain the 
above mentioned processes and also to 
elaborate an interpretation which may 
help to formulate a global explanation 
of the plitical blockade which now 
prevents the opposition from carrying 
out its vaim of replacing the authorita- 
rian State. On the other hand, the 
extensive references are meant to in- 
clude the most significative studies on 
the subject so as to serve as a guide to 
further historic research on the autho- 
ritarian period. With such a purpose in 
mind I have divided the present article 
into three separate parts. In the first 
one, give account of economic proces- 
ses accompanying the recurring crisis 
of the authoritarian political system 
from 1981 onward, which, taken as a 
whole, account for the upsetting of the 
global project to restructure society 
which was fostered by the military 
dictatorship. In the second part. I in- 
troduce the changes concerning social 
stratification, the nature of the new 
setting of social classes and the trans- 
formation of a military bureaucracy 
into a poltical class at the service of 
the State as a result of the replacement 
of the monetarist pattern of develop- 
ment put into practice since 1975. In 
the third and final part, an account is 
given of the political processes which 
converge into the remaking of the new 
political scene, in which the opposition 
and the Right wing and other sectors 
supporting the dictatorship play a role 
involving a reorganization process. 
Peripheral Capitalism and Reproductive Behaviour 
Ilemographic increase in peripheral 
social formations has been commonly 
viewed as a limit or barrier to develop- 
ment in these societies, and even as an 
apocalypse rider for present-day man- 
kind as a whole. Though from the 
classics themselves there have been 
approaches to the issue, making repro- 
ductive behaviour a dependent varia- 
ble of economics dynamics, the usual 
treatment of population in pure econo- 
mics and in most other methodologies 
has been as a datum, somewhat exoge- 
nous to economic analysis. This is, in 
our opinion, an erroneous way of rela- 
ting economy and population, since it 
only leads to a useless debate on the 
binomial (cpopulation-resources., trea- 
ted as infrastructural and exogenous 
issues, while actually both of them are 
defined by a specific structure itself 
resulting from a mode of production. 
What, then, this mode of production 
has to do with demographic dynamics 
and above all, with reproductive beha- 
viour, is a scheme of gr'eat importance 
to reintroduce the binomial in structu- 
ral determination. 
In this article we develop, in general 
terms an analytical scheme to explain 
peripheral reproductive behaviour as a 
response of the labour force to periphe- 
ral capitalism, whose characteristics 
and functionality subordinated to 
world scale capitalist accumulation 
draw a specific form of reproduction of 
the labour force (what we call ((nan 
value-ferm))), which impels expansive 
reproductive behaviour. We define the 
economic structural ambits in which 
this form of LF reproduction develops: 
the autoconsumption and the simple 
mercantile sphere, and show why pe- 
ripheral capitalism perpetuates their 
existence. 
We make an insight into some Latin 
American countries with different de- 
mographic behaviours and show how 
our analytical scheme can explain such 
differences. 
There are, finally, two consideration: 
in the first place, if the economic struc- 
ture is the one which impels expansive 
reproductive behaviour, no superstruc- 
tural policies will avoid the ademo- 
graphic problem.. Secondly, the ((over- 
population, in underdeveloped coun- 
tries is just the appearance of some 
population law, ownership of the capi- 
talist mode of production, acting in the 
Periphery of the world capitalist sys- 
tem for the maintenance of the world 
scale accumulation. 
